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The current study examined the relationship between self-reported somatic symptomatology and 
neural patterns of threat-processing in anxious youth. It attempted to merge discrepant findings 
regarding somatic awareness in anxiety by differentiating between more chronic somatic anxiety 
symptoms and an experiential (“situational”) awareness of bodily symptoms in response to an 
acute stressor. Forty-two adolescents (ages 9-13), meeting DSM-IV criteria for GAD, Social 
Phobia, and/or Separation Anxiety completed a classic dot-probe task in which they indicated the 
location of a probe that replaced either threatening or neutral faces. Mean BOLD responses on to 
threat trials were extracted for anatomically defined regions of interest that have been related to 
anxiety, and this activity was correlated with self-reported somatic subscale scores. Results 
indicated that, within a sample of anxious youth, chronic somatic anxiety symptomatology was 
negatively correlated with sustained bilateral amygdala activity, while situational somatic 
symptomatology was associated with increased sustained bilateral anterior insula and caudal 
anterior cingulate activity. Thus, patients who display blunted emotional reactivity to  mild threat 
cues may be more prone to chronic somatic anxiety symptoms. In addition, patients who 
maintain an awareness of interoceptive cues during low-grade threat-processing may be more 
likely to notice and report bodily cues under periods of more acute threat. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The current study examined individual differences in anxiety-related somatic symptoms reported 
by anxiety-disordered youth, and attempted to link patients' awareness of these symptoms with 
neural patterns of threat-processing. We differentiated between more chronic somatic anxiety 
symptoms and an experiential awareness of bodily symptoms during high-anxiety situations (i.e., 
“situational” somatic symptoms). Because somatic symptom reports are presumably dependent 
on patients’ subjective awareness of bodily sensations, we asked whether activation in brain 
regions subserving attention to threat and interoceptive processing could explain individual 
differences in chronic and situational somatic symptom rates. In order to detect brain activation 
during relevant implicit attentional processes, we collected brain activation data while 
participants performed a basic probe detection task that has been previously used to elicit threat-
related attentional biases in anxious youth (i.e., Pine, Guyer, & Leibenluft, 2008).  
1.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOMATIC SYMPTOMS IN PEDIATRIC ANXIETY 
Anxiety disorders are the most frequently diagnosed psychiatric syndrome in children and 
adolescents, with prevalence rates ranging between 12 and 20% (Costello, Mustillo, Erkanli, 
Keeler, & Angold, 2003). Diagnosed youth often show impairment in the areas of family, 
academic, and social functioning, and are at high risk for developing additional psychiatric 
conditions in adulthood (Ezpeleta, Keeler, Erkanli, Costello, & Angold, 2001; Ialongo, Edelsohn, 
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Werthamer Larsson, Crockett, & Kellam, 1995). Somatic symptomatology is a primary feature 
of pediatric and adolescent anxiety disorders, and youth with anxiety are significantly more 
likely than their nonanxious peers to report chronic somatic symptoms (Ginsburg, Riddle, & 
Davies, 2006).  Although research on pediatric anxiety is expanding at an impressive rate, 
limited attention has been paid to the role that somatic symptoms may play in these disorders.  
1.2 LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Previous studies have attempted to link patients’ self-reported somatic symptoms to anxiety 
related elevations in autonomic arousal, but group comparisons between anxious and non-
anxious individuals have failed to find reliably higher physiological reactivity in patients 
(Hoehn-Saric, McLeod, Funderburk, & Kowalski, 2004; Last, 1992; Roemer & Borkovec, 1993). 
Researchers have also been unable to consistently link individual differences in state and trait 
physiological arousal with subjective somatic symptoms. (Anderson & Hope, 2009; McLeod, 
Hoehn-Saric, & Stefan, 1986; F. H. Wilhelm & W. T. Roth, 2001). Recent evidence has 
suggested that the subjective experience of arousal-related bodily sensations may be more 
relevant to anxiety pathology than the accurate detection of physiological phenomena (Edelmann 
& Baker, 2002; Mauss, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2004; F. H. Wilhelm & W. T. Roth, 2001). In 
addition, previous studies of self-reported somatic anxiety have addressed constructs that are 
only partially related to the construct of trait somatic awareness. For example, anxiety 
sensitivity—defined as the tendency to catastrophize physical arousal symptoms, (Reiss & 
McNally, 1985)—is a trait that is characteristic of panic disorder. Some anxious youth with other 
anxiety disorders score more highly than healthy controls on self-report measures of this 
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construct (Rabian, Peterson, Richters, & Jensen, 1993; 1995). However, anxiety sensitivity is a 
construct that refers to a misappraisal bodily sensations rather than a general hyper-awareness of 
them. Perhaps most importantly, to our knowledge, no research on anxiety-related somatic 
symptoms in pediatric populations has drawn a distinction between more chronic anxiety-related 
somatic symptoms and somatic symptoms that occur in response to acute threat. This distinction 
is important because the relative salience of internal threat stimuli can be affected by one’s 
concurrent engagement with external threat stimuli (Cioffi, 1991). 
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2.0  BACKGROUND 
Both adult and pediatric anxiety disorders have been associated with alterations in the way 
threat-related information is processed. Much of the previous research on these biases has 
focused on selective attention to external threat cues (S. J. Bishop, 2008; Puliafico & Kendall, 
2006; Roy, et al., 2008), although an excessive attention to somatic sensations has also been 
named as an anxiety-related attentional bias. Somatic sensations serve as the primary set of threat 
cues for individuals with panic disorder. However, there have been mixed results regarding the 
degree to which this is true in other anxiety disorders (e.g., F. Wilhelm & W. Roth, 2001).  
The dilemma that served as a motivation for the current study arises from a discrepancy 
between two bodies of evidence in the pediatric anxiety literature. On one hand, many anxious 
children and adolescents report significant somatic symptomatology, suggesting that these youth 
are hyper-aware of bodily sensations. On the other hand, studies from the developmental 
psychopathology literature indicate that anxious youth have a poor awareness of their own 
emotional state, a deficit that should theoretically coincide with poor somatic awareness.  
Although they are more emotionally reactive, anxious youth appear to be less 
emotionally self-aware than their non-anxious peers (Suveg & Zeman, 2004; Zeman, Cassano, 
Perry-Parrish, & Stegall, 2006). They exhibit broad deficits in emotional understanding, 
including difficulty labeling and differentiating their own emotional states (Southam-Gerow & 
Kendall, 2000, 2002). Because a precise awareness of one’s current emotional state is considered 
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necessary for adaptive emotion regulation (Cioffi, 1991; Jellesma, Rieffe, Terwogt, & 
Kneepkens, 2006), it has been argued that anxious youth may benefit from treatments that 
attempt to increase their knowledge and awareness of their own emotions (Weems, Zakem, 
Costa, Cannon, & Watts, 2005). Most popular cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) protocols for 
treating pediatric anxiety include a component that teaches patients to attend to subjective 
somatic sensations during periods of high arousal (Kendall, et al., 2006). Early steps in these 
interventions aim to increase patients’ subjective awareness of experiential somatic sensations in 
order to recognize that they are feeling anxious (Albano & Kendall, 2002; Kendall, Treadwell, 
Hibbs, & Jensen, 1996). After instruction in proper coping skills, an awareness of somatic 
anxiety symptomatology during high-arousal situations should cue the individual to engage in 
learned regulation strategies. The rationale for this aspect of treatment seems to be largely 
anecdotal, with little empirical evidence. Although low somatic awareness is not explicitly 
portrayed as an inherent deficit in pediatric anxiety, the use of this treatment component seems to 
conflict with research findings implying that some anxious youth already pay too much attention 
to somatic sensations (e.g., Ginsburg, et al., 2006). 
2.1 NEURAL FEATURES OF THREAT PROCESSING AND SOMATIC 
AWARENESS: RELEVANT BRAIN-BASED THEORETICAL MODELS. 
Although existing neuroimaging studies have explored anxiety-related individual differences in 
threat-processing and individual differences in bodily awareness, these two literatures have 
tended not to intersect. Findings from these two areas can be used to implicate a particular circuit 
of brain regions that should theoretically show an association with individual differences in 
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anxiety-related somatic awareness. Based on existing fMRI literature, several brain regions 
appear to play a role in both the generation of feeling states and the awareness of bodily 
sensations that co-occur with those feeling states. These regions include the amygdala, the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the anterior insula. While there are several existing 
theoretical accounts of how this system of brain regions operates, a few particular models are 
relevant to the current study. 
2.1.1 Information-processing models and vigilance-avoidance 
Information-processing models of anxiety have emphasized the role of attentional biases in the 
development and maintenance of anxiety disorders. Individual theoretical models have varied in 
the extent to which they describe anxiety-related biases as a tendency to preferentially shift 
attention toward threat-related information (i.e., showing a “hypervigilance” for threat), or away 
from it (i.e., showing an “avoidance” of threat), and there is some evidence that both kinds of 
attentional bias may occur at different temporal stages of threat processing.  A “vigilance-
avoidance” model of anxiety has been proposed (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998, 1999), in which the time-course of attention allocation is taken into account. The model 
describes a two-step process in the allocation of attention, in which early attentional vigilance is 
demonstrated by rapid automatic responses to perceived threat, with a strong orienting response 
towards novel and threatening stimuli. Avoidance involves the subsequent averting of attention 
from threat as an attempt to regulate anxious mood state. This sustained cognitive avoidance 
pattern could maintain anxious responses by preventing individuals from habituating to anxiety-
producing stimuli (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). While this model has found some support in studies 
comparing adult anxiety patients with healthy controls, studies of attentional biases in anxious 
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children has tended to find either vigilance or avoidance, but not both (McClure, et al., 2007; 
Daniel S. Pine, et al., 2005; Roy, et al., 2008). To our knowledge, however, no fMRI studies 
have conceptualized of these attentional biases as individual differences that may perpetuate 
somatic anxiety symptoms for some patients but not others. 
The primary brain mechanisms thought to subserve vigilance and avoidance are the 
amygdala and the caudal ACC. In the presence of external threat cues, the amygdala signals the 
presence of affectively salient stimulus features. Amygdala hyper-reactivity is considered a 
hallmark of selective attention for threat, and anxious youth tend to show greater amygdala 
activation than controls in response to negative emotional stimuli (Guyer, et al., 2008; McClure, 
et al., 2007; Monk, et al., 2008; Thomas, et al., 2001). Increased amygdala activity is also 
thought to give rise to increased activity the caudal ACC, a region implicated in monitoring 
emotionally relevant behavioral responses and recruiting prefrontal top-down control regions. 
Hyper-reactivity in the caudal ACC is hypothesized to lead to the overuse of cognitive avoidance 
as an anxiety-related coping response (S. Bishop, Duncan, Brett, & Lawrence, 2004; Killgore & 
Yurgelun-Todd, 2005; Thomas, et al., 2001). In imaging studies using supraliminal (i.e. 
consciously perceptible) stimulus presentation times, anxious subjects who displayed an initially 
vigilant orienting response for threat subsequently engaged in emotional avoidance, as indicated 
by blunted late amygdala responses (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988; Etkin, et al., 2004). Thus, in 
response to threatening stimuli, increased early but decreased sustained amygdala activity along 
with increased caudal ACC activity are purported neural features of vigilance-avoidance. 
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2.1.2 Interoceptive processing and conscious somatic and emotional awareness 
Brain-based models of interoceptive processing have identified neural substrates of the 
awareness of internal threat-cues. These models emphasize the role of the amygdala in 
coordinating a synchronized physical arousal response to threat (i.e., S. Bishop, et al., 2004). 
Internal cues of arousal are picked up by the anterior insula, a region implicated in the perception 
of somatic sensations and the integration of these sensations into consciously accessible 
emotional feelings (Craig, 2004; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004). Critchley 
and colleagues have highlighted the anterior insula’s role in integrating internal arousal cues with 
appraisals of external emotional stimuli (Critchley, et al., 2004). Contextualized somatic 
information is passed on to the rostral ACC, which is involved in assessing the salience of 
emotional. This portion of the ACC has strong reciprocal connections with the anterior insula, 
along with a number of brain regions involved in affective and autonomic processing, including 
the amygdala. According to fMRI research in healthy adults, both the anterior insula and the 
rostral ACC are active when research subjects pay attention to subjective emotional states and 
unpleasant visceral sensations (Gregory, et al., 2003; Herwig, Kaffenberger, Jäncke, & Brühl; 
Pollatos, Kirsch, & Schandry, 2005).  Thus, in response to threat-related bodily arousal initiated 
by the amygdala, anterior insula and rostral ACC activation are considered to be hallmarks of 
conscious somatic and emotional awareness.  
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2.2 A MODEL FOR RESOLVING THE DILEMMA: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
IN THE TIME-COURSE OF THREAT-PROCESSING 
The brain-based models of threat-processing and interoceptive awareness discussed in the 
previous section have mainly been used to explain or test for group differences between anxiety-
disordered patients and healthy controls. The current study adopts an individual-differences 
approach in relating brain mechanisms of threat processing and interoceptive awareness to 
patients’ somatic anxiety symptoms. The model put forth in the current study is based on the 
premise that, within the population of anxious youth, patients who engage in vigilance for or 
avoidance of external threat cues may have a similar pattern of attending to somatic cues. As 
such, threat-related brain reactivity patterns associated with a greater processing of external 
emotional stimuli (i.e., more amygdala activity) and internal bodily cues (i.e., more insula and 
rostral ACC activity) should be more common in patients who experience more somatic anxiety 
symptoms. However, some patients may only be aware of anxiety-related somatic cues at 
specific times, such as during exposure to acute stressors, when arousal is likely to be high. 
Those patients who are  less aware of their own acute stress-related somatic sensations may also 
be less emotionally self-aware, and may therefore be  more likely to engage in maladaptive 
emotion regulation strategies in response to negatively arousing situations (Suveg & Zeman, 
2004).  
In addition to accounting for individual differences in somatic awareness, we also sought 
to combine a time-course model of threat-processing (such as the vigilance-avoidance model 
described above) with accounts of interoceptive awareness in the brain. And individual patient’s 
level of somatic awareness can therefore be considered a dynamic characteristic varies 
depending on the context it is measured in. This way, the tendency to experience chronic somatic 
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anxiety symptoms and the tendency to experience stressor-induced “situational” somatic 
symptoms can be conceptualized as separate individual difference characteristics that relate 
independently to threat-related brain functioning. Applying a construct such as vigilance-
avoidance could even produce a hypothetical situation in which some anxious youth display both 
vigilance for chronic somatic symptoms of anxiety and attentional avoidance of uncomfortable 
bodily sensations during acutely stressful situations. For these individuals, the use of this and 
other avoidant emotion regulation methods could lead to longer bouts of emotional distress and 
low-level physiological activation, which in turn could give rise to more chronic somatic anxiety 
symptoms (Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006; Hoehn-Saric, et al., 2004).  A representative 
schematic of this hypothetical process is shown in Figure 1.  
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This figure is intended to illustrate possible individual differences in the way somatic symptom information is 
consciously processed by pediatric anxiety patients. For example, the red line depicts a patient who is generally 
hyper-vigilant for anxiety-related bodily cues and therefore scores high on self-report measures of chronic somatic 
anxiety symptoms. In the context of external threat, this same patient avoids attending to acute somatic symptoms 
and reports low levels of situational somatic symptoms. The solid red and blue lines represent two cases in a dataset 
in which chronic and situational symptoms are inversely correlated, although it is also possible that they are 
positively correlated (as shown by the sample of dashed lines) or unrelated to one another.  
Figure 1. Hypothetical trajectories of somatic awareness. 
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3.0  THE CURRENT STUDY 
In the current study, the tendency to notice and report anxiety-related somatic symptoms was 
conceptualized as trait that varies between patients, and that also varies within individuals 
depending on the context in which symptoms are measured. Chronic somatic anxiety symptoms 
were assessed using the panic/somatic subscale of a well-known anxiety symptom inventory for 
children. It was assumed that anxious youth who were more chronically aware of or 
hypervigilant for somatic arousal cues would report more of these kinds of symptoms. As a 
measure of “situational” somatic awareness, we collected symptom reports from patients just 
prior to the performance of a social evaluation speech task, when patients were likely to be 
experiencing high emotional arousal and/or distress. Laboratory tasks that include a social-
evaluative component have been shown to lead to increases in cortisol, pro-inflammatory 
responses, and autonomic arousal (Dickerson, Mycek, & Zaldivar, 2008), and the preparation 
and performance of a similar speech task has been shown to induce both physiological arousal 
and subjective anxiety in anxious youth (Gunnar, Talge, & Herrera, 2009; Gunnar, Wewerka, 
Frenn, Long, & Griggs, 2009).  
In order to elicit potentially biased brain activation patterns during threat-processing, we 
utilized a standard probe-detection task that required participants to respond to simple probes 
that replace neutral and fearful faces or plain shapes. The Dot Probe paradigm has been used in 
multiple behavioral and neuroimaging studies to assess attentional biases in pediatric anxiety 
(Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1999; M. W. Vasey, El Hag, & Daleiden, 
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1996). Because of the requirements for attentional control in the presence of distracting 
emotional stimuli, this task typically engages the amygdala and ACC. We therefore expected 
task-related activations to reveal individual differences in neural patterns of vigilant and/or 
avoidant attention allocation.  
Based on previous research that chronic somatic symptoms rates increase with overall 
anxiety severity, we predicted that chronic somatic symptoms of anxiety would be positively 
correlated with all other (i.e., non-somatic) anxiety symptoms. In accordance with our 
conceptualization of chronic and situational somatic symptom awareness as distinctive patient 
characteristics, we also predicted that self-reported chronic and situational symptom rates would 
be unrelated or inversely correlated. 
We further hypothesized that chronic somatic symptom scores would be positively 
correlated with brain activity patterns implicated in attentional vigilance and avoidance. In other 
words, we predicted that greater chronic somatic anxiety symptomatology would be associated 
with: 1) increased initial activation but decreased sustained activation of the bilateral amygdala, 
and 2) increased activation of the caudal ACC. We also predicted that chronic somatic symptoms 
would be negatively correlated with patterns implicated in somatic and emotional self-awareness, 
such that greater symptomatology would be associated with: 3) decreased activation in the 
bilateral anterior insula, and 4) decreased activation in the rostral ACC. 
In devising hypotheses about brain activity and situational somatic symptomatology, we 
reasoned that patients who showed more reactivity to (i.e., less experiential avoidance of) 
external and internal stimuli during the presentation of mildly threatening pictures would also 
notice and report the most intense situational somatic symptoms. We therefore hypothesized that 
situational somatic symptom scores would be associated with a) greater late amygdala activity, 
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b) less caudal ACC activity, c) greater anterior insula activity, and d) greater rostral ACC 
activity.  
3.1 METHODS 
3.1.1 Participants 
Participants included 42 clinically anxious youth (20 male, 22 female), ages 9-13 (M = 10.4, SD 
= 1.2). The sample was largely Caucasian, containing only two African American children, and 
one child of mixed race. Recruitment was conducted as part of a larger study investigating 
psychological and biological mechanisms of clinical pediatric anxiety at baseline and following 
CBT. Recruitment methods included advertising, school counselor or teacher referral, and 
pediatrician referral. All participants met DSM-IV criteria for one or more of the following 
diagnoses: Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), Social Phobia (SoPH), and/or Separation 
Anxiety Disorder (SAD).  
Exclusion criteria included: the presence of a comorbid primary major depressive 
disorder (MDD) (subjects with primary GAD and co-morbid MDD that was deemed secondary 
in terms of course and functional impact were not excluded); current Axis I diagnosis of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), panic disorder, 
conduct disorder, substance abuse or dependence, and ADHD combined type or hyperactive-
impulsive type; lifetime diagnosis of autism or Asperger’s syndrome, bipolar disorder, psychotic 
depression, schizophrenia, or schizoaffective disorder; IQ < 70; current psychoactive medication 
use (included anxiolytics and antidepressants); imminent risk of suicide or harm to self or others; 
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inability to complete questionnaires written in English; and any condition that might prevent 
participation in fMRI procedures (because of the presence of pacemakers, surgically implanted 
metal plates, screws or pins, metal braces, or other metal objects in the body). Of the participants 
used in the current study, 24 (57.1%) presented with a single anxiety diagnosis only (GAD n = 
15, SAD n = 6, SoPH n = 3) and 18 (42.9%) had two or more concurrent psychiatric disorders. 
The frequencies of specific anxiety disorders were as follows: GAD = 31, SAD = 10, SoPH = 9, 
specific phobia = 6. Additional concurrent psychiatric disorders included ADHD (inattentive 
subtype, n = 2; NOS, n = 1), and enuresis (n = 3). At the time of the intake, one child reported a 
history of MDD, and another qualified for a diagnosis of MDD in partial remission. 
3.1.2 Self-report measures 
3.1.2.1 Chronic somatic anxiety symptoms 
The Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders – Child Version  (SCARED-C; 
Birmaher, Khetarpal, Cully, Brent, & McKenzie, 2003) is a 41-item self-report questionnaire that 
asks children to report the frequency of individual anxiety symptoms over the past three months, 
using a three-point Likert scale. It was designed with five symptom subscales based on 
individual DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for panic/somatic symptoms, general anxiety, separation 
anxiety, social anxiety, and significant school avoidance. These subscales have been confirmed 
by factor analysis and they demonstrate good internal consistency, with coefficient α values 
ranging between .78 and .87 (B Birmaher, et al., 1999). The somatic/panic subscale has a total 
possible score of 26, and a score above 7 is used as a cutoff for a classification of significant 
somatic anxiety symptomatology. This subscale has been used to detect somatic symptomatology 
in diverse non-panic anxious samples (Eley, Stirling, Ehlers, Gregory, & Clark, 2004; Peter 
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Muris, et al., 1998) and has been found to differentiate anxiety-disordered youth from youth with 
other forms of internalizing and externalizing psychopathology (B. Birmaher, et al., 1999).   
3.1.2.2 Situational somatic anxiety symptoms 
After preparing for the speech task (described below), each participant completed the Child 
Somatization Inventory (CSI) (Revised 24-item version; Walker, Beck, Garber, & Lambert, 
2008). This instrument is a self-report questionnaire
 
that assesses the perceived severity of 24 
nonspecific somatic
 
symptoms including headaches, nausea, dizziness, and chest pain. The 
revised 24-item scale is a shortened version of the original CSI (Garber, Walker, & Zeman, 
1991), which contained 31 items and was constructed to include symptoms from the DSM-III 
criteria for somatization disorder (Association., 1987). Typically, the child is asked to report the 
extent to which he or she has been experiencing each of the symptoms on 4-point scale (ranging 
from not at all to a whole lot) in the previous 2 weeks. A total score is obtained by summing the 
ratings, with a highest possible score of 140.  
For the purpose of the current study, the CSI was administered as a measure of situational 
somatic symptoms, with the child being asked to report how much he or she is experiencing each 
individual symptom “right now”, versus in the past two weeks. Because the CSI has not been 
previously administered in this manner, no relevant statistics on the measure’s use are available 
to report. In the current sample of 42 anxious youth, the measure demonstrated good internal 
consistency, with a coefficient α of .89.  
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3.2 PROCEDURE  
Following the confirmation of their inclusion in the study, children and their parents provided 
written informed consent for the child’s participation. Participants’ diagnoses were assessed 
using the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia for School-Age Children – Present 
and Lifetime Version (K-SADS-PL) (Kaufman et al., 1997). Parent and child interviews were 
conducted separately, with independent evaluators integrating data from both sources to arrive at 
a consensual diagnosis. Anxious participants also filled out baseline self-report measures. On 
their second visit, participants completed the fMRI scan (see below for specific fMRI 
procedure). On their third visit, participants completed the behavioral speech task described 
below. 
3.2.1 Social-threat speech task 
On their third visit to the lab, mother-child dyads were asked to complete a series of structured 
parent-child interaction tasks designed to elicit affective responses among the children. In the 
context of the greater study protocol, the speech task was designed to assess the mother’s 
behavior in helping the child plan for and cope with this anxiety-provoking task. For the purpose 
of the current study, the speech task served as social-evaluative stress induction during which we 
assessed participants’ self-reported situational somatic symptoms. Following the completion of 
the other parent-child interaction tasks, children were told they would be giving a speech in front 
of a video camera, and that their performance skills would be assessed and compared to other 
children’s skills. They were not told how long the speech needed to be. Children were asked to 
rank three potential speech topics in order of how much they would want to speak on that topic. 
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The topics included “something you have learned from reading a book”, “something you learned 
recently in science”, and “something that you think is wrong with our government and how you 
would fix it”. Children were always assigned the topic they ranked as #2. After the 5 minutes of 
collaborative preparation and discussion about their child’s feelings about the speech, parents 
were shown back to the waiting room. At this point, just prior to giving the speech, children were 
handed a copy of the CSI and fill it out with respect to how they were currently feeling. Items 
were read aloud to children who had difficulty reading the questions.  
3.2.2 fMRI Assessment Procedure 
After completing training for fMRI tasks and a pre-scan exposure in a mock scanner, participants 
underwent 10 minutes of structural scanning. They then completed a battery of computerized 
behavioral tasks during concurrent fMRI assessment, which lasted approximately 40 minutes. 
Because task order was randomized, the task being analyzed for the current study was completed 
at different times in the assessment sequence for each participant. 
3.2.3 fMRI Dot-Probe Task 
In the dot-probe task being used in current study, the task alternated between two trial types: one 
in which a fearful face was presented on one side of a screen and a neutral face was presented on 
the other, and one in which 2 circles were presented. “Circle” trials were used as a baseline 
comparison condition. For both trial types, the face or circle stimuli were followed by a probe. 
Subjects responded with a button press to identify the location of a probe that replaced either the 
fearful face (congruent) or the neutral face (incongruent). Face or circle stimuli appeared on 
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screen for either 200ms or 2000ms  before being replaced by the dot-probe screen, which 
remained on screen for 7-9 seconds, depending on the length of stimulus presentations. The 
probe following each stimulus trial remained on the screen for 2s. In the current study, stimuli 
were placed vertically from each other, rather than horizontally, as has been used in previous 
studies. Participants completed total of 80 trials (20 faces trials and 20 circles trials in each of the 
long and short conditions), split into two eight-minute blocks. All trials lasted a total of 11.7 
seconds, leaving room for the occurrence of potential differences in “early” and “late” brain 
activity.  
3.2.4 Apparatus 
fMRI data were collected on the Pittsburgh’s Brain Imaging Research Center’s 3T Siemens 
Allegra scanner (as in Project 1 Preliminary data). Visual stimuli were presented on a rear 
projection screen and viewed through a mirror attached to the head coil. Stimulus presentation 
and behavioral response/reaction-time collection were conducted via a Windows computer 
running E-prime (Psychology Software Tools) connected to an RF shielded response box 
connected to a 5-button glove. Twenty-nine axial slices (3.2mm isotropic voxels) were acquired 
every 1.67 seconds parallel to the AC-PC line using a T2* weighted reverse EPI pulse sequence 
(TR=1670ms, TE=25ms, FOV=24cm, flip=72). Scanning began with stimulus onset. Anatomical 
scans were acquired at the same locations as the functional imaging scans, using a reconstructed 
MPRAGE pulse sequence. 
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3.2.5 fMRI Data Preparation 
Reconstructed fMRI images were time slice corrected using AFNI’s (Cox, 1996) 3dTshift, and 
resliced using 3dVolReg movement correction algorithm. Images were registered to the first 
image in the series to correct for head movements. Linear detrending and outlier rescaling were 
performed using NIScorrect (Jonathan Cohen, Princeton University, and Cameron Carter, 
University of California, Davis). Outliers over two inter-quartile ranges from the median were 
rescaled, and all functional data were converted to %-change. Data were temporally smoothed 
using a four point Gaussian filter to identify robust sustained event-related changes in MR signal. 
Images for all subjects were co-registered to the MNI reference brain using AIR's alignwarp 
procedure to compute a 32 parameter non-linear warping algorithm (Woods & Mazziotta, 1993) 
and spatially smoothed using a 6mm FWHM three dimensional Gaussian filter to accommodate 
individual differences in anatomy. While data generally suggest that warping to the MNI brain 
yields adequate registrations of gray matter in children (Hoeksma, Kenemans, Kemner, & van 
Engeland, 2005), registrations were checked by hand and with the lab’s automated diagnostic 
procedures, including examination of variance maps across images.  
3.2.6 Definition of anatomically defined regions 
Anatomically defined amygdalae were traced on high resolution structural scans. Anatomically 
defined rostral and caudal ACC subregions (BA24, and 32 respectively), were defined using the 
AAL atlas (as in Forbes, et al., 2006). Volumes were cross-rendered to each participant’s 
anatomical data using a 32-parameter non-linear warping algorithm (Woods & Mazziotta, 1993) 
and rendered in the space of the functional data.  
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3.2.7 Generation of brain activation scores 
In order to generate activity scores for each individual on the dot-probe task, the following steps 
were taken: At the individual subject level, BOLD percent (%) signal change was calculated for 
each scan of a trial, using the first scan as a baseline scan. Mean activity from “circle” trials was 
subtracted from “face” trials data, in order to control for effects of probe location and subjects’ 
general brain reactivity to a suddenly appearing stimulus. This was done for all regions of 
interest, including the left and right amygdala, left and right anterior insula, and the rostral and 
caudal cingulate (the last two of which are both midline structures and were not divided into 
lateral subregions).  
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4.0  DATA ANALYSES 
All group-level statistical analyses were performed in MATLAB and SPSS. Before correlating 
brain activity with somatic symptom scores, descriptives were run on CSI and SCARED scores 
to detect outliers. For CSI scores, outliers differing from the median by a an absolute value that 
exceeded 1.5 times the interquartile range were replaced with Md+/-1.5*IQR. No outliers 
meeting this criteria were found in the SCARED somatic score distribution. We used Pearson 
product-moment correlations (r) to test a priori hypotheses about associations between self-
report symptom measures. Correlation statistics were calculated for the association of chronic 
somatic anxiety symptoms with other chronic anxiety symptoms, and for the association between 
“chronic” and “situational” somatic symptoms. 
Pearson product-moment correlations were also used to test a priori hypotheses about 
associations between threat-related brain activity and somatic symptom reports. For each region 
of interest, mean BOLD % signal change values were correlated with symptom for each of 6 
scans per trial (i.e., from scans 2-7). To control for Type I error, two consecutive scans with a 
significant correlation at p<.05 were required for correlations to be considered significant. This 
temporal length threshold was derived via randomization tests (1000 simulations in which 
subjects’ observed waveforms were randomly assigned to rumination observed factor scores). 
These tests were used to determine the number of consecutive scans that would occur by chance 
at the given significance level less than five percent of the time (i.e., at a frequency of p<.05). 
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In addition, existing research has shown effects of age and gender on somatic anxiety 
symptomatology. In non-anxious populations, rates of self-reported somatic symptomatology 
(including both anxiety-specific symptoms and general physical symptoms) appear to increase as 
children get older and peak during adolescence (P. Muris, Hoeve, Meesters, & Mayer, 2004; 
Offord, et al., 1987). In addition, females appear to be more likely than males to experience 
somatic symptoms, and  they show a greater age-related increase in the frequency of reported 
symptoms (Eminson, Benjamin, Shortall, Woods, & Faragher, 2006; Taylor, Szatmari, Boyle, & 
Offord, 1996). Thus, preliminary correlation analyses were conducted to determine whether 
participants’ age and gender variables were significant predictors of anxiety-related somatic 
symptoms in a sample of clinically anxious youth.  
In order to further validate and explore any significant associations found between brain 
activity and somatic symptoms, we conducted a series of sensitivity analyses. To confirm that the 
temporal windows of BOLD activation identified in zero-order correlation analyses were 
independent predictors of somatic symptoms above and beyond age, gender, and non-somatic 
anxiety symptoms, we ran subsequent hierarchical regression analyses that accounted for these 
variables following the correlation analyses. Mean activation values for each temporal window 
were calculated by summing activation at each scan for all significant scans, and dividing by the 
number of scans in the window. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis were then run, entering 
selected preliminary variables (i.e., gender, age, or non-cognitive anxiety when appropriate) as 
predictors at step one, and the mean activation value for the region of interest at step two.  
Lastly, in order to further explore the potential role of patients’ attentional biases in 
observed associations between BOLD activation and somatic symptoms, we used reaction time 
data from the dot-probe task to calculate behavioral indices of biased attention. As described in 
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(D.S. Pine, et al., 2005), within-subject bias scores were calculated by subtracting each 
participant’s mean response latency on congruent trials from their mean response latency on 
incongruent trials. Positive bias scores are thought to indicate an attentional bias toward the 
fearful face (vigilance), while negative scores indicate attentional bias away from the emotional 
face (avoidance). We ran Pearson product-moment correlations between these bias scores and 
somatic symptom scores. For somatic symptom measures that were significantly correlated with 
attentional bias scores, we entered bias scores into a hierarchical regression as described above.  
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5.0  RESULTS 
5.1 PRELIMINARY ANALYSES 
Results testing for a significant effect of gender and age on somatic symptoms indicated a 
significant relationship between gender and chronic somatic anxiety symptoms, t(38.8) = -2.69, p 
= .01, with females reporting more severe symptoms than males, Mfemale(SD) = 11.3(6.0) 
Mmale(SD) = 6.9(4.5). There was no effect of gender on situational somatic symptom scores, 
t(38.8) = -.798, p = .43. Age was not significantly associated with chronic, r = .14, p = .39, or 
situational somatic symptom reports, r = .05, p = .74. Because gender was a significant predictor 
of chronic symptoms, we ran sensitivity analyses following the correlation of brain activity with 
chronic somatic symptoms.  
Table 1. Self-report measure descriptives 
Measure/subscale M (SD) Range 
Trait symptoms (SCARED-C) 39.4 12.5 19-67 
    Panic/somatic symptoms 9.2 5.7 1-22 
    Generalized anxiety symptoms 10.9 3.7 3-16 
    Separation anxiety symptoms 8.5 3.5 3-16 
    Social anxiety symptoms 7.6 3.4 0-14 
    Significant school avoidance 3.2 1.9 0-7 
    Total non-somatic 30.2 8.4 12-46 
CSI (with outliers rescaled) 8.3 9.6 0-31.1 
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5.1.1 Association between chronic somatic and other chronic anxiety symptoms 
Characteristics of the sample’s self-report data can be found in Table 1, including patients’ 
scores on all of the SCARED symptom subscales. SCARED total and subscale mean scores are 
consistent with scores previously reported in clinically anxious youth (B. Birmaher, et al., 1999). 
In agreement with our hypothesis, rates of chronic somatic anxiety symptoms were positively 
correlated with other types of anxiety symptoms, r(42) = .57, p < .001. Thus, participants 
reporting high levels of somatic symptoms were also more likely to report high levels of non-
somatic anxiety symptoms. Because subsequent correlations between brain activity and 
SCARED somatic scores could be accounted for by a shared association with overall anxiety 
severity. 
5.1.2 Association between chronic and situational somatic symptoms 
In accordance with our hypothesis, situational somatic symptom reports given during acute threat 
were not significantly associated with rates of chronic somatic anxiety symptomatology, r = .19, 
p = .22.  
5.1.3 fMRI Results 
Figure 2 shows correlation matrices of participants’ self-reported somatic symptom levels with 
mean BOLD activation in each ROI at each scan. Correlation values exceeding a significance 
threshold of p < .05 are marked with an asterisk (*). In order to control for Type I error, only 
regions in which two or more consecutive scans met this threshold are discussed as significant in 
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the following results. For descriptive purposes, mean activation values were calculated for the 
periods of significant correlation, and individuals’ mean activation values were correlated with 
somatic symptom scores. These correlations are the values given in the text below.  
 
In this figure, color maps represent correlation matrices of each somatic symptoms measure (chronic and situational) 
with BOLD % signal change across 7 scans (11.7 seconds). Asterisks denote scans at which correlation values were 
significant at p<.05. Only regions whose activity correlated with somatic symptom scores at three or more scans (the 
temporal threshold determined by randomization tests) were interpreted as significant. Scatterplots show the 
relationship between patients’ symptom scores and mean activation at the significant temporal windows indicted in 
the corresponding correlation matrix.  
Figure 2. Correlations between brain activity in a priori regions of interest and somatic symptom scores.  
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5.1.4 Association between chronic somatic symptoms and brain activity 
In order to test the hypothesis that higher situational somatic anxiety symptom awareness would 
be associated with lower indices of attentional avoidance, individuals’ SCARED-somatic scores 
were correlated with their brain activity during the dot probe task. (For a table containing 
correlation and significance values for each scan, please refer to the supplementary data section.) 
As shown in Figure 2, chronic somatic symptom rates were negatively correlated with bilateral 
amygdala activity (left: scans 3-5, r = -.45, p = .003; right: scans 3-7, r = -.44, p = .004). No 
other regions were significantly associated with chronic somatic symptomatology after 
controlling for Type I error. In the right anterior insula and the caudal ACC, isolated early scans 
demonstrated negative correlations that did not persist after Type I error correction.  
Because correlations do not convey the direction of BOLD % signal change patterns  (i.e. 
whether low chronic somatic patients had greater BOLD activation in the bilateral amygdala or 
high chronic somatic patients had larger BOLD deactivations), Figure 3a contains graphs 
illustrating qualitative differences in amygdala activity that characterized high and low chronic 
somatic symptom reporters (high = green, low = blue). Patients were divided into these groups 
based on whether their SCARED panic/somatic score fell above or below the cutoff for a 
designation of “clinically significant” somatic symptoms. Based on these illustrative graphs, 
negative correlational findings appear to be a result of low chronic somatic patients showing 
sustained increases in bilateral amygdala activity, while high chronic somatic patients showed a 
small initial deactivation, followed by a smaller increase in activation. 
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In this figure, the graphs show mean BOLD % signal change across 7 scans (11.7 seconds) for the low chronic 
somatic group (n = 17)  in blue, and the high chronic somatic group (n = 25), in green. Red significance bars denote 
periods for which the two groups showed significant differences in activation at p<.05. Statistics from independent 
samples t-tests are shown for comparisons that revealed significant group differences.  
Figure 3a. Illustrative group comparison of amygdala activation for patients with high and low chronic somatic 
symptoms of anxiety 
5.1.5 Association between situational somatic symptoms and brain activity 
As shown in Figure 2, situational somatic symptom rates were positively correlated with 
sustained bilateral anterior insula activity, left insula: scans 5-6, r = .34, p = .03; right insula: 
scans 5-7, r = .40, p = .008. Situational symptoms were also correlated with sustained caudal 
ACC activity, 5-6, r = .37, p = .02. No other regions were significantly associated with 
situational somatic symptoms after controlling for Type I error. Isolated early scans in the right 
anterior insula, rostral ACC, and caudal ACC showed significant negative correlations, and a late 
scan in the rostral ACC showed a significant positive correlation, but associations did not persist 
after Type I error correction.  
 30 
Figure 3b contains graphs illustrating qualitative differences in left and right anterior 
insula and caudal ACC activity for high and low situational somatic symptom groups (high = 
green, low = blue). Because no cutoff score has ever been defined for CSI scores collected in the 
manner we collected them, patients were divided into high and low groups based on a median 
split (n = 21 for each group). The positive correlation between situational somatic symptoms and 
right anterior insula activity appears to be a result of high situational somatic patients showing 
sustained activations in that region, while low situational somatic patients showed little change 
from baseline. In the caudal ACC, the positive correlation appears to be driven by the high 
somatic group’s sustained activation when low somatic patients showed a small deactivation. 
 
In this figure, the graphs show mean BOLD % signal change across 7 scans (11.7 seconds) for the low situational 
somatic symptoms group (n = 21)  in blue, and the high situational somatic symptoms group (n = 21), in green. Red 
significance bars denote periods for which the two groups showed significant differences in activation at p<.05.  
Statistics from independent samples t-tests are shown for comparisons that revealed significant group differences.  
Figure 3b. Illustrative group comparison of anterior insula and caudal ACC activation for patients with high and 
low situational somatic symptoms 
 31 
5.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
In order to ensure that the brain-somatic symptom association was not attenuated by gender, we 
ran a hierarchical multiple regression analysis for each ROI in which activity was predictive of 
chronic symptoms (i.e., the left and right amygdala). Following a stepwise approach, gender was 
entered at step 1 and the mean activation value for the correlated temporal window was entered 
at step 2. When gender was used as the sole predictor, it accounted for 15% of the variance in 
SCARED-somatic scores. Adding left amygdala activity to the model resulted in a significant 
increase in variance explained, R
2
 = .31, ΔR2 = .16, F(1,39) = 9.16, p = .004, with left amygdala 
activity serving as a significant independent predictor of chronic symptom scores, sr
2
 = .16, p = 
.004. The gender variable continued to explain significant independent variance in this second 
model, sr
2
 = .11, p = .02. When the same analysis was run using right amygdala activity as an 
additional predictor at step two, amygdala activity again resulted in a significant increase in 
variance explained, R
2
 = .29, ΔR2 = .14, F(1,39) = 7.4, p = .01. Like the left amygdala, right 
amygdala activity accounted for significant independent variance in the model, sr
2
 = .14, p = .01, 
as did the gender variable, sr
2
 = .10, p = .03.  
In addition, because non-somatic SCARED scores were significantly correlated with 
somatic SCARED scores, an additional sensitivity analysis was run to see if the associations 
between amygdala activity and chronic somatic symptoms were better explained by non-somatic 
anxiety severity. When entered at step one, non-somatic SCARED scored accounted for 32% of 
the variance in patients’ SCARED-panic/somatic scores. Adding left amygdala activity to the 
model resulted in a significant increase in variance explained, R
2
 = .43, ΔR2 = .10, F(1,39) = 7.1, 
p = .01, with left amygdala activity serving as a significant independent predictor of chronic 
symptom scores, sr
2
 = .10, p = .01. The gender variable continued to explain significant 
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independent variance in this second model, sr
2
 = .22, p = <.001. Statistical results were only 
slightly weaker, but still significant, when right rather than left amygdala activity was entered at 
step two, R
2
 = .41, ΔR2 = .09, F(1,39) = 6.1, p = .02. Both right amygdala activity and non-
somatic SCARED scores served as significant independent predictors of SCARED somatic 
scores, sr
2
 = .09, p = .01and sr
2
 = .22, p <.001, respectively. 
5.3 BEHAVIORAL RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
Participants’ attentional bias scores (in milliseconds) ranged from -514 to 674 (average = -20, SD 
= 231). Bias scores were significantly negatively correlated with chronic somatic symptom 
scores (r = -.31, p = .04), indicating that patients who reported more chronic somatic anxiety 
symptoms were more likely to show an attentional avoidance of threat, while than patients with 
fewer chronic symptoms were more likely to show an attentional vigilance for threat. No 
significant association was found between bias scores and situational somatic symptoms. 
In order to test whether correlations between amygdala activity and chronic symptoms 
could be explained as attentional biases to external threat observed during the dot-probe task, 
hierarchical regression analyses were run with bias scores entered at step 1 and amygdala activity 
at step two.  When entered at step one, attentional bias scores accounted for 10% of the variance 
in patients’ chronic somatic symptom scores. Adding left amygdala activity to the model resulted 
in a significant increase in variance explained, R
2
 = .26, ΔR2 = .16, F(1,39) = 8.3, p = .006, with 
left amygdala activity serving as a significant independent predictor of chronic symptom scores, 
sr
2
 = .16, p = .006. The attentional bias variable no longer explained significant independent 
variance in this second model, sr
2
 = .05, p = .11, although no significant correlation was found 
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between attentional bias scores and left amygdala activity (r = .20, p = .21). Results were similar 
when right amygdala activity was entered at step two, R
2
 = .27, ΔR2 = .10, F(1,39) = 9.2, p = 
.004, although both attentional bias scores and right amygdala activity remained significant 
independent predictors of somatic chronic anxiety scores, sr
2
 = .08, p = .04 and sr
2
 = .17, p = 
.004, respectively. No correlation was found between attentional bias scores and right amygdala 
activity (r = .07, p = .65). Thus, attentional bias moderated the association between left amygdala 
activity chronic somatic anxiety symptomatology. 
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6.0  DISCUSSION 
The primary purpose of the current study was to examine the relationship between individual 
differences in neural patterns of threat-processing and self-reported somatic symptomatology and 
using fMRI and self-report data from a sample of clinically anxious youth. Taking into 
consideration discrepant previous findings regarding the degree of somatic awareness possessed 
by anxious youth, we hoped that differentiating between more chronic somatic anxiety-related 
symptoms and situational bodily symptoms perceived during an acute stressor.  
As expected, participants who reported high levels of chronic anxiety-related somatic 
symptoms were more likely to report high levels of other chronic anxiety symptoms. This 
finding is consistent with previously reported associations between somatic symptomatology and 
overall severity of anxiety symptoms (Beidel, Christ, & Long, 1991). Also in accordance with 
our hypotheses, our measures of chronic and situational somatic anxiety symptoms were not 
significantly related to one another. Hence, clinically anxious youth who experience more 
prominent somatic symptoms of anxiety are not necessarily more aware of bodily symptoms that 
arise in response to acute stress.   
Our hypothesis that individual differences in chronic somatic anxiety symptomatology 
would be associated with neural indices of early hypervigilance and subsequent attentional 
avoidance was partially supported. Corresponding to the “avoidance” aspect of the model, 
sustained bilateral amygdala activity was negatively correlated with chronic somatic symptoms, 
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even after controlling for the effects of gender and non-somatic anxiety severity. Based on 
behavioral data analyses, patients who experienced more chronic somatic symptoms were also 
more likely to show an attentional avoidance of fearful faces, while patients with few chronic 
somatic symptoms were more likely to display attentional vigilance. Unfortunately, because 
individual differences in attentional bias were related to symptom rates independently of 
amygdala activity, we cannot interpret lower amygdala activity as a measure of attentional 
avoidance. Moreover, higher somatic chronic anxiety was not associated with greater activation 
in brain areas thought to monitor emotional reactivity and engage higher-level cognitive control 
regions to down-regulate it (i.e., the ACC). As amygdala activation is considered to be a measure 
of attentional engagement and emotion processing (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Monk, et al., 2003), 
these activation patterns could instead indicate that patients who experience more chronic 
somatic symptoms are simply less emotionally reactive to mild threat stimuli than their less 
somatic fellow patients. It is important to note that many of items used to assess chronic somatic 
manifestations of anxiety (on the SCARED panic/somatic subscale) asked patients to report on 
the frequency with which participants’ experienced specific symptoms when they were 
frightened. Patients who endorse more of these items may in fact be demonstrating a trait 
awareness of the physiological consequences of their high anxiety.  
Our hypothesis that individual differences in situational somatic symptomatology would 
be associated with neural indices of greater emotional reactivity and somatic awareness in 
response to threat was also partially supported; patients who reported experiencing more 
situational somatic symptoms in response to high social-evaluative threat displayed greater 
sustained activation in the bilateral anterior insula. Based on previous fMRI studies of insula 
functioning, this pattern could indicate that patients with more severe stressor-induced bodily 
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symptoms also engage in greater implicit interoceptive monitoring during threat-processing. The 
majority of fMRI studies that have previously reported a relationship between chronic anxiety 
symptomatology and insula activation have used tasks that called for explicit interoceptive or 
emotional self-focus (Critchley, et al., 2004; McClure, et al., 2007; Passarotti, Sweeney, & 
Pavuluri, 2009), or tasks that involve the anticipation of a highly aversive stimulus (Simmons, 
Strigo, Matthews, Paulus, & Stein, 2006). In the current study, there were no task demands for 
interoceptive processing, and the threat-level of stimuli were low.  However, the length of the 
trials (11.7 seconds) left a period of several seconds during which subjects could potentially 
engage in stimulus-independent thought. During this pause, patients who notice situational 
somatic symptoms during high threat might also by more likely to return to a subtle focus on 
bodily sensations.  
However, we had also predicted that situational symptom levels would be negatively 
associated with activity in the caudal ACC, a region implicated in signaling the need for 
cognitive control resources. Contrary to that prediction, sustained caudal ACC activity was 
positively associated with situational somatic symptoms. Based on anxiety-related theories of 
vigilance discussed previously, this activation pattern could be a result of somatically-aware 
patients maintaining vigilance for the presentation of the next threat stimulus. Although it has 
been classically thought of as the “cognitive” portion of the anterior cingulate, the caudal ACC 
also appears to play a role in the generation of phasic autonomic arousal increases during the 
performance of more demanding tasks that call for effortful cognitive control and attention 
allocation (Critchley, et al., 2004). It is unlikely that our relatively simple dot probe task elicited 
such a substantial need for cognitive effort and, in the absence of peripheral physiological data, 
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we cannot determine whether increased dorsal ACC activity resulted in autonomic arousal 
increases.   
Although the correlational nature of the current study prevents us from discussing threat 
processing biases as causal byproducts of somatic symptoms, our results suggest that anxious 
youth who maintain an implicit interoceptive monitoring and action-readiness in response low-
grade threat may also be more likely to notice and report bodily threat cues during periods of 
more acute threat. In addition, anxious youth who display neural indices of blunted emotional 
responses external threat cues could be at higher risk for experiencing prominent anxiety-related 
somatic symptoms. 
The current study has a number of limitations. First, this study used somatic symptom 
reports as a measure of patients’ subjective experience of their chronic and situational anxiety-
related symptoms. Aside from the possible influence of typical flaws in self-report measure (such 
as experimenter demand characteristics, patients’ social desirability, and limited conscious 
access to internal experience), a number of known factors interact with basic awareness of or 
attention to bodily sensations. Patients may differ in the degree to which they demonstrate biased 
appraisals of bodily sensations, and may have differing levels of perceived anxiety control.  For 
youth who  feel unable to cope with their anxiety, somatic symptoms are likely to be much more 
distracting and emotionally distressing. In the current study, we did not attempt to measure 
negative beliefs about somatic sensations or the perceived ability to handle them. In addition, the 
tendency to experience somatic anxiety symptoms over time, and the tendency to experience 
situational somatic anxiety symptoms in response to threat were both conceptualized as trait-like 
characteristics and presumed to be relatively stable over time. Unfortunately, limited information 
is available on the temporal stability of these kinds of symptoms. Although individual 
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differences in stressor-induced physiological reactivity appear to be relatively reliable for 
intervals of up to several years (Cohen & Hamrick, 2003), research on the stability of subjective 
physiological stress-reactivity is scarce.  
It is also worth noting that the brain imaging data from the present study were recorded 
during a simple probe detection task that utilized a slow event-related design and images of 
neutral or fearful human faces. As such, the task would be considered to involve a relatively low 
level of perceived threat to participants. Previous studies in anxious youth have varied their 
stimuli by perceived threat level, and have found that patients demonstrate more aberrant 
amygdala, insula, and ACC activity with respect to controls during periods when threat stimuli 
were more intense (Nitschke, et al., 2009; Simmons, et al., 2006). If the goal is to determine 
which pediatric anxiety patients deviate the most from healthy controls, and if somatic threat-
processing is more uniform across anxiety patients under higher threat conditions, future studies 
should use more intensely threatening stimuli before correlating somatic symptom reports with 
brain activity. 
In summary, results from the current study suggest that among anxiety-disordered youth, 
the tendency to experience chronic somatic anxiety symptoms and the tendency to experience 
stressor-induced “situational” somatic symptoms are distinct individual difference 
characteristics. Moreover, these two constructs are associated with unique patterns of threat-
related brain activity. Although a great deal of research has being conducted to identify factors 
responsible for poor emotional self-awareness in anxious youth, this was to our knowledge the 
first study that attempted to link threat-processing biases with somatic awareness in an attempt to 
explain this phenomenon. We interpreted positive correlations between situational somatic 
symptom reports and activation during threat processing as potential evidence that that youth 
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who maintain interoceptive monitoring during low-level external threat may also be more likely 
to notice and report bodily cues under periods of more acute threat. In addition, anxious youth 
who display an attentional avoidance to external and/or subjective emotional threat cues during 
low-level threat may be more prone to chronic somatic anxiety symptomatology. 
 40 
APPENDIX A 
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE 
Table 2. Correlation values for associations od BOLD %-signal change in a priori ROIs with trait and situational 
symptom scores 
Correlation with trait symptoms 
Brain region 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Left Amygdala corr (r)  0 -0.18 -0.38 -0.44 -0.40 -0.29 -0.48 
  sig (p) 0 0.26 0.01 0.003 0.009 0.06 0.001 
Right Amygdala corr (r)  0 -0.24 -0.40 -0.45 -0.36 -0.33 -0.33 
  sig (p) 0 0.13 0.009 0.003 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Left Anterior Insula corr (r)  0 0.00 -0.22 -0.12 -0.07 -0.21 -0.24 
  sig (p) 0 0.98 0.16 0.43 0.67 0.18 0.13 
Right Anterior Insula corr (r)  0 -0.12 -0.31 -0.27 -0.18 -0.23 -0.30 
  sig (p) 0 0.44 0.05 0.09 0.26 0.14 0.06 
Rostral ACC corr (r)  0 -0.11 -0.22 -0.25 -0.17 -0.13 -0.22 
  sig (p) 0 0.49 0.16 0.11 0.29 0.42 0.16 
Caudal ACC corr (r)  0 -0.19 -0.32 -0.28 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24 
  sig (p) 0 0.22 0.04 0.07 0.21 0.17 0.12 
Correlation with trait symptoms 
Brain region   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Left Amygdala corr (r)  0 -0.04 0.01 0.14 0.12 0.25 0.20 
  sig (p) 0 0.79 0.94 0.37 0.43 0.12 0.20 
Right Amygdala corr (r)  0 -0.06 -0.09 0.06 0.14 0.24 0.25 
  sig (p) 0 0.69 0.58 0.70 0.37 0.13 0.12 
Left Anterior Insula corr (r)  0 -0.21 -0.13 -0.06 0.34 0.31 0.26 
  sig (p) 0 0.19 0.41 0.70 0.03 0.05 0.09 
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Right Anterior Insula corr (r)  0 -0.31 -0.13 0.03 0.38 0.42 0.36 
  sig (p) 0 0.04 0.40 0.84 0.01 0.005 0.02 
Rostral ACC corr (r)  0 -0.40 -0.14 -0.04 0.30 0.36 0.29 
  sig (p) 0 0.009 0.36 0.81 0.05 0.02 0.07 
Caudal ACC corr (r)  0 -0.37 -0.24 0.21 0.32 0.37 0.27 
  sig (p) 0 0.02 0.21 0.20 0.03 0.01 0.10 
 
Note: Correlation and significance values in which p <.05 are bolded and italicized. 
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APPENDIX B 
CSI-24-R 
YOUR PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS  
How much are you currently bothered  
by each symptom? 
Not 
at all 
A 
little Some A lot 
A 
whole 
lot 
1. Headaches 0 1 2 3 4 
2. Faintness or dizziness (feeling faint or dizzy) 0 1 2 3 4 
3. Pain in your heart or chest 0 1 2 3 4 
4. Feeling low in energy or slowed down 0 1 2 3 4 
5. Pains in your lower back 0 1 2 3 4 
6. Sore muscles 0 1 2 3 4 
7. Trouble getting your breath 0 1 2 3 4 
8. 
Hot or cold spells (suddenly feeling hot or cold for 
no reason) 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. Numbness or tingling in parts of your body 0 1 2 3 4 
10. Weakness (feeling weak) in parts of your body 0 1 2 3 4 
11. 
Heavy feelings in your arms or legs (when they feel 
too heavy to move) 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. 
Nausea or upset stomach (feeling like you might 
throw up, or having an upset stomach) 
0 1 2 3 4 
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YOUR PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS  
How much are you currently bothered  
by each symptom? 
Not 
at all 
A 
little Some A lot 
A 
whole 
lot 
13. Pain in your stomach or abdomen (stomach aches) 0 1 2 3 4 
14. Your heart beating too fast 0 1 2 3 4 
15. Difficulty swallowing 0 1 2 3 4 
16. Losing your voice 0 1 2 3 4 
17. Blurred vision 0 1 2 3 4 
18. Vomiting (or throwing up) 0 1 2 3 4 
19. Feeling bloated or gassy 0 1 2 3 4 
20. Food making you sick 0 1 2 3 4 
21. Pain in your knees, elbows or other joints 0 1 2 3 4 
22. Pain in your arms or legs 0 1 2 3 4 
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APPENDIX C 
SELF REPORT FOR CHILDHOOD ANXIETY RELATED DISORDERS (SCARED) - 
CHILD FORM 
Below is a list of items that describe how people feel.  For each item that describes you for the 
last 3 months, please circle the 2 if the item is very true or often true of you.  Circle the 1 if 
the item is somewhat or sometimes true of you.  If the item is not true of you, please circle the 
0.  Please answer all items as well as you can, even if some do not seem to concern you. 
  
0 
Not true or 
hardly ever 
true 
1 
Somewhat 
true or 
sometimes 
true 
2 
Very true 
or often 
true 
1. When I feel frightened, it is hard to breathe. 0 1 2 
2. I get headaches when I am at school. 0 1 2 
3. I don’t like to be with people I don’t know well. 0 1 2 
4. I get scared if I sleep away from home. 0 1 2 
5. I worry about other people liking me. 0 1 2 
6. When I get frightened, I feel like passing out. 0 1 2 
7. I am nervous. 0 1 2 
8. I follow my mother or father wherever they go. 0 1 2 
9. People tell me that I look nervous. 0 1 2 
10. I feel nervous with people I don’t know well. 0 1 2 
11. I get stomachaches at school 0 1 2 
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0 
Not true or 
hardly ever 
true 
1 
Somewhat 
true or 
sometimes 
true 
2 
Very true 
or often 
true 
12. When I get frightened I feel like I am going crazy. 0 1 2 
13. I worry about sleeping alone. 0 1 2 
14. I worry about being as good as other kids. 0 1 2 
15. When I get frightened, I feel like things are not real. 0 1 2 
16. 
I have nightmares about something bad happening to 
my parents. 
0 1 2 
17. I worry about going to school. 0 1 2 
18. When I get frightened, my heart beats fast. 0 1 2 
19. I get shaky. 0 1 2 
20. 
I have nightmares about something bad happening to 
me. 
0 1 2 
21. I worry about things working out for me. 0 1 2 
22. When I get frightened I sweat a lot. 0 1 2 
23. I am a worrier. 0 1 2 
24. I get really frightened for no reason at all. 0 1 2 
25. I am afraid to be alone in the house. 0 1 2 
26. It is hard for me to talk with people I don't know well. 0 1 2 
27. When I get frightened, I feel like I am choking. 0 1 2 
28. People tell me that I worry too much. 0 1 2 
29. I don’t like to be away from my family. 0 1 2 
30. I am afraid of having anxiety (or panic) attacks. 0 1 2 
31. I worry that something bad might happen to my parents. 0 1 2 
32. I feel shy with people I don’t know well. 0 1 2 
33. I worry about what is going to happen in the future. 0 1 2 
34. When I get frightened I feel like throwing up. 0 1 2 
35. I worry about how well I do things. 0 1 2 
36. I am scared to go to school. 0 1 2 
37. I worry about things that have already happened. 0 1 2 
38. When I get frightened, I feel dizzy. 0 1 2 
39. 
I feel nervous when I am with other children or adults 
and have to do something while they watch me (for 
example: read aloud, speak, play a game, play a sport). 
0 1 2 
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0 
Not true or 
hardly ever 
true 
1 
Somewhat 
true or 
sometimes 
true 
2 
Very true 
or often 
true 
40. 
I feel nervous about going to parties, dances, or any 
place where there will be people I do not know well. 
0 1 2 
41. I am shy. 0 1 2 
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